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CHEETAH: An Ultra-Fast, Approximation-Free,
and Privacy-Preserved Neural Network
Framework based on Joint Obscure Linear and
Nonlinear Computations
Qiao Zhang, Cong Wang, Chunsheng Xin, and Hongyi Wu
Abstract—Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) is enabling a wide range of smart applications on end devices. However, such
convenience comes with a cost of privacy because users have to upload their private data to the cloud. This research aims to provide
effective and efficient MLaaS such that the cloud server learns nothing about user data and the users cannot infer the proprietary
model parameters owned by the server. This work makes the following contributions. First, it unveils the fundamental performance
bottleneck of existing schemes due to the heavy permutations in computing linear transformation and the use of communication
intensive Garbled Circuits for nonlinear transformation. Second, it introduces an ultra-fast secure MLaaS framework, CHEETAH, which
features a carefully crafted secret sharing scheme that runs significantly faster than existing schemes without accuracy loss. Third,
CHEETAH is evaluated on the benchmark of well-known, practical deep networks such as AlexNet and VGG-16 on the MNIST and
ImageNet datasets. The results demonstrate more than 100× speedup over the fastest GAZELLE (Usenix Security’18), 2000×
speedup over MiniONN (ACM CCS’17) and five orders of magnitude speedup over CryptoNets (ICML’16). This significant speedup
enables a wide range of practical applications based on privacy-preserved deep neural networks.
Index Terms—privacy; machine learning as a service; secure two party computation; joint obscure neural computing
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
F ROM Alexa and Google Assistant to self-driving vehi-cles and Cyborg technologies, deep learning is rapidly
advancing and transforming the way we work and live. It
is becoming prevalent and pervasive, embedded in many
systems, e.g., for pattern recognition [1], medical diagnosis
[2], speech recognition [3] and credit-risk assessment [4].
In particular, deep Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
has demonstrated superior performance in computer vision
such as image classification [5], [6] and facial recognition [7],
among many others.
Since training a deep neural network model is resource-
intensive, cloud providers begin to offer Machine Learning
as a Service (MLaaS) [8], where a proprietary model is
trained and hosted on clouds, and clients make queries (in-
ference) and receive results through a web portal. While this
emerging cloud service is embraced as important tools for
efficiency and productivity, the interaction between clients
and cloud servers creates new vulnerabilities for unau-
thorized access to private information. This work focuses
on ensuring privacy-preserved while efficient inference in
MLaaS.
Although communication can be readily secured from
end to end, privacy still remains a fundamental challenge.
On the one hand, the clients must submit their data to the
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cloud for inference, but they want the data privacy well pro-
tected, preventing curious cloud provider frommining valu-
able information. In many domains such as health care [9]
and finance [10], data are extremely sensitive. For example,
when patients transmit their physiological data to the server
for medical diagnosis, they do not want anyone (including
the cloud provider) to see it. Regulations such as Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [11]
and the recent General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
in Europe [12] have been in place to impose restrictions
on sharing sensitive user information. On the other hand,
cloud providers do not want users to be able to extract
their proprietary, valuable model that has been trained with
significant resource and efforts, as it may turn customers
into one-time shoppers [13]. Furthermore, the trained model
contains private information about the training data set
and can be exploited by malicious users [14], [15], [16]. To
this end, there is an urgent need to develop effective and
efficient schemes to ensure that, in MLaaS, a cloud server
does not have access to users’ data and a user cannot learn
the server’s model.
1.1 Retrospection: Evolvement of Privacy-Preserved
Neural Networks
The quest began in 2016 when CryptoNets [17] was pro-
posed to embed Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [29] into
CNN. It was the first work that successfully demonstrated
the feasibility of calculating inference over Homomorphi-
cally encrypted data. While the idea is conceptually straight-
forward, its prohibitively high computation cost renders it
2TABLE 1
Comparison of Privacy-Preserved Neural Networks.
Scheme for Linear Computation Scheme for Non-Linear Computation Speedup over [17]
CryptoNets [17] HE HE (square approx.) –
Faster CryptoNets [18] HE HE (polynomial approx.) 10×
GELU-Net [19] HE Plaintext (no approx.) 14×
E2DM [20] Packed HE & Matrix optimization HE (square approx.) 30×
SecureML [21] HE & Secret share GC (piecewise linear approx.) 60×
Chameleon [22] Secret share GMW & GC (piecewise linear approx.) 150×
MiniONN [23] Packed HE & Secret share GC (piecewise linear approx.) 230×
DeepSecure [24] GC GC (polynomial approx.) 527×
SecureNN [25] Secret share GMW (piecewise linear approx.) 1000×
FALCON [26] Packed HE with FFT GC (piecewise linear approx.) 1000×
XONN [27] GC GC (piecewise linear approx.) 1000×
GAZELLE [28] Packed HE & Matrix optimization GC (piecewise linear approx.) 1000×
CHEETAH Packed HE & Obscure matrix cal. Obscure HE & SS (no approx.) 100,000×
impractical for most applications that rely on non-trivial
deep neural networks with a practical size in order to
characterize complex feature relations [6]. For instance,
CryptoNets takes about 300s for computing inference even
on a simple three-layer CNN architecture. With the increase
of depth, the computation time grows exponentially. More-
over, several key functions in neural networks (e.g., acti-
vation and pooling) are nonlinear. CryptoNets had to use
Taylor approximation, e.g., replacing the original activation
function with a square function. Such approximation leads
to not only degraded accuracy compared with the original
model, but also instability and failure in training.
Following CryptoNets, the past two years have seen a
multitude of works aiming to improve the computation
accuracy and efficiency (as summarized in Table 1). A neural
network essentially consists of two types of computations,
i.e., linear and nonlinear computations. The former focuses
on matrix calculation to compute dot product (for fully-
connected dense layers) and convolution (for convolutional
layers). The latter includes nonlinear functions such as acti-
vation, pooling and softmax. A series of studies have been
carried out to accelerate the linear computation, or nonlinear
computation, or both. For example, faster CryptoNets [18]
leveraged sparse polynomial multiplication to accelerate the
linear computation. It achieved about 10 times speedup
over CryptoNets. SecureML [21], Chameleon [22] and Min-
iONN [23] adopted a similar design concept. Among them,
MiniONN achieved the highest performance gain. It applied
Secret Share (SS) for linear computation, and packed HE [30]
to pre-share a noise vector between the client and server
offline, in order to cancel the noise during secure online
computation. In [23], non-linear functions were approxi-
mated by piece-wise linear segments, and computed by
using Garbled Circuits (GC), which resulted in 230 times
speedup over CryptoNets. DeepSecure [24] took an all-
GC approach, i.e., implemented both linear and nonlinear
computations using GC. It optimized the gates in the tradi-
tional GC module to achieve a speedup of 527 times over
CryptoNets. Finally, GAZELLE [28] focused on the linear
computation, to accelerate the matrix-vector multiplication
based on packed HE, such that Homomorphic computa-
tions can be efficiently parallelized on multiple packed
ciphertexts. GAZELLE demonstrated impressive speedup of
about 20 times compared with MiniONN and three orders
of magnitude faster than CryptoNets. So far, GAZELLE is
considered the state-of-art framework for secure inference
computation.
Two recent works unofficially published in arXiv re-
ported new designs that achieved computation speed at
the same order of magnitude as GAZELLE. FALCON [26]
leveraged fast Fourier Transform (FFT) to accelerate linear
computation. Its computing speed is similar to GAZELLE,
while the communication cost is higher. SecureNN [25]
adopted a design philosophy similar to Chameleon and
MiniONN, but exploited a 3-party setting to accelerate
the secure computation, to obtain a 4 times speedup over
GAZELLE, at the cost of using a semi-trust third party.
Additionally, XONN [27] worked in line with DeepSecure
to explore the GC based design for Binary Neural Network
(BNN), achieving up to 7 times speedup over GAZELLE, at
the cost of accuracy drop due to the binary quantization in
BNN.
In addition, a few approaches were introduced to not
just improve computation efficiency but also provide other
desirable features. For example, GELU-Net [19] aims to
avoid approximation of non-linear functions. It partitioned
computation onto non-colluding parties: one party performs
linear computations on encrypted data, and the other exe-
cutes nonpolynomial computation in an unencrypted but
secure manner. It showed over 14 times speedup than Cryp-
toNets and does not have accuracy loss. E2DM [20] aimed to
encrypt both data and neural network models, assuming the
latter are uploaded by users to untrusted cloud. It focused
on matrix optimization by combining Homomorphic oper-
ation and ciphertext permutation, demonstrating 30 times
speedup over CryptoNets.
1.2 Contribution of This Work
Despite the fast and promising improvement in compu-
tation speed, there is still a significant performance gap
to apply privacy-preserved neural networks on practical
applications. The time constraints in many real-time appli-
cations (such as speech recognition in Alexa and Google
Assistant) are within 10 seconds [31], [32]; self-driving cars
even demand an immediate response less than a second [33].
In contrast, our benchmark has showed that GAZELLE,
which has achieved the best performance so far in terms of
3speed among existing schemes, takes 161s and 1731s to run
the well-known practical deep neural networks AlexNet [5]
and VGG-16 [6], which renders it impractical in real-world
applications.
In this paper, we propose CHEETAH, an ultra-fast,
secure MLaaS framework that features a carefully crafted
secret sharing scheme to enable efficient, joint linear and
nonlinear computation, so that it can run significantly faster
than the state-of-the-art schemes. It eliminates the need
to use approximation for nonlinear computations; hence,
unlike the existing schemes, CHEETAH does not have accu-
racy loss. It, for the first time, reduces the computation delay
to milliseconds and thus enables a wide range of practical
applications to utilize privacy-preserved deep neural net-
works. To the best of knowledge, this is also the first work
that demonstrates privacy-preserved inference based on the
well-known, practical deep architectures such as AlexNet
and VGG.
The significant performance improvement of CHEETAH
stems from a creative design, called joint obscure neural
computing. Computations in neural networks follow a se-
ries of operations alternating between linear and nonlinear
transformations for feature extraction. Each operation takes
the output from the previous layer as the input. For exam-
ple, the nonlinear activation is computed on the weighted
values of linear transformations (i.e., the dot product or
convolution). All existing approaches discussed in Sec. 1.1
essentially follow the same framework, aiming to securely
compute the results for each layer and then propagate to
the next layer. This seemingly logic approach, however,
becomes the fundamental performance hurdle as revealed
by our analysis.
First, although matrix computation has been deeply op-
timized based on packed HE for the linear transformation
in the state-of-the-art GAZELLE, it is still costly. The com-
putation time of the linear transformation is dominated by
the operation called ciphertext permutation (or Perm) [28],
which generates the sum based on a packed vector. It is
required in both convolution (for a convolutional layer) and
dot product (for a dense layer). From our experiments, one
Perm is 56 times slower than one Homomorphic addition
and 34 times slower than one Homomorphic multiplica-
tion. We propose an approach to enable an incomplete
(or obscure) linear transformation result to propagate to
the next nonlinear transformation as the input to continue
the neural computation, reducing the number of ciphertext
permutations to zero in both convolution and linear dot
product computation.
Second, most existing schemes (including GAZELLE)
adopted GC to compute the nonlinear transformation (such
as activation, pooling and softmax), because GC generally
performs better than HE when the multiplicative depth is
greater than 0 (i.e., nonlinear) [28]. However, the GC-based
approach is still costly. The overall network must be repre-
sented as circuits and involves interactive communications
between two parties to jointly evaluate neural functions
over their private inputs. The time cost is often significant
for large and deep networks. Specifically, our benchmark
shows that it takes about 263 seconds to compute a nonlin-
ear ReLu function with 3.2M input values, which is part of
the VGG-16 framework [6]. Moreover, all existing GC-based
solutions rely on piece-wise or polynomial approximation
for nonlinear functions such as activation. This leads to
degraded accuracy and the accuracy loss is often significant.
The proposed scheme takes a secret sharing approach with
0-multiplicative-depth packed HE to avoid the use of com-
putationally expensive GC. A novel design is developed to
allow the server and client to each obtain a share of Homo-
morphic encrypted nonlinear transformation result based
on the obscure linear transformation as discussed above.
This approach eliminates the need to use approximation for
nonlinear functions and achieves enormous speedup. For
example, it is 1793 times faster than GAZELLE in comput-
ing the most common nonlinear ReLu activation function,
under the output dimension of 10K.
Overall, the proposed CHEETAH is an ultra-fast privacy-
preserved neural network inference framework without
accuracy loss. It enables obscure neural computing that
intrinsically merges the calculation of linear and nonlinear
transformations and effectively reduces the computation
time. We benchmark the performance of CHEETAH with
well-known deep networks for secure inference. Our results
show that it is 218 and 334 times faster than GAZELLE,
respectively, for a 3-layer and a 4-layer CNN used in pre-
vious works. It achieves a significant speedup of 130 and
140 times, respectively, over GAZELLE in the well-known,
practical deep networks AlexNet and VGG-16. Compared
with CryptoNets, CHEETAH achieves a speedup of five
orders of magnitudes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 in-
troduces the system and threat models. Section 3 elaborates
the system design of CHEETAH, followed by the security
analysis in Section 4. Experimental results are discussed in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 SYSTEM AND THREAT MODELS
In this section, we introduce the overall system architecture
and threat model, as well as the background knowledge
about cryptographic tools used in our design.
2.1 System Model
We consider a MLaaS system as shown in Fig. 1. The client is
the party that generates or owns the private data. The server
is the party that has a well-trained deep learning model and
provides the inference service based on the client’s data. For
example, a doctor performs a chest X-ray for her patient and
sends the X-ray image to the server on the cloud, which runs
the neural network model and returns the inference result
to assist the doctor’s diagnosis.
While various deep learning techniques can be em-
ployed to enable MLaaS, we focus on the Convolutional
ServerClient
Private chest X-ray
Inference result:
Pneumonia
Fig. 1. An overview of the MLaaS system.
4Neural Network (CNN), which has achieved wide success
and demonstrated superior performance in computer vision
such as image classification [5], [6] and face recognition [7].
A CNN consists of a stack of layers to learn a complex
relation among the input data, e.g., the relations between
pixels of an input image. It operates on a sequence of
linear and nonlinear transformations to infer a result, e.g.,
whether an input medical image indicates the patient has
pneumonia. The linear transformations are in two typical
forms: dot product and convolution. The nonlinear transfor-
mations leverage activations such as the Rectified Linear Unit
(ReLu) to approximate complex functions [34] and pooling
(e.g., max pooling and mean pooling) for dimensionality
reduction. CNN repeats the linear and nonlinear transfor-
mations recursively to reduce the high-dimensional input
data to a low-dimensional feature vector for classification
at the fully connected layer. Without losing generality, we
use image classification as an example in the following
discussion, aiming to provide a lucid understanding of the
CNN architecture as illustrated in Fig. 2.
Convolutional Layer. As shown in Fig. 2(b), the input to
a convolutional layer has the dimensions of wi × hi × ci,
where wi and hi are the width and height of the input
feature map and ci is the number of the feature maps (or
channels). For the first layer, the feature maps are simply
the input images. Hereafter, we use the subscript i to denote
input and o output. The input is convolved with co groups
of kernels. The size of each group of kernel is kp×kq× ci, in
which kp and kq are the width and height of the kernel. The
number of channels of the kernel group must match with
the input, i.e., ci. The convolution will produce the feature
output, with a size of wo × ho × co. More specifically, the
(m,n)-th element in the t-th (1 ≤ t ≤ co) output feature is
calculated as follows:
z(m,n, t) =
ci∑
j=1
kp−1∑
u=0
kq−1∑
v=0
k(u, v, j, t)x(m− u, n− v, j), (1)
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Fig. 2. A three-layer CNN: (a) overall network structure, (b) convolutional
layer, (c) pooling, (d) fully connected layer.
where k and x are the kernel and input, respectively. For the
ease of description, we omit the bias in Eq. (1). Nevertheless,
it can be easily transformed into the convolution or weight
matrix multiplication [35].
The last convolutional layer is typically connected with
the fully-connected layer, which computes the weighted sum,
i.e., a dot product between the weight matrix w of size no×
ni and a flatten feature vector of size ni × 1. The output is
a vector with the size of no × 1. Each element of the output
vector is calculated below:
z(i) =
ni∑
j=1
w(i, j)x(j). (2)
Activation. Nonlinear activation is applied to convolu-
tional and weighted-sum outputs in an elementwise man-
ner. The commonly used activation functions include ReLu,
f(x) = max{0, x}; sigmoid, f(x) = 11+e−x ; and tanh,
f(x) = e
2x
−1
e2x+1 . The last layer uses the softmax function
f(x) = e
x
∑
i
ex(i)
to normalize the outputs into a probability
vector.
Pooling. Pooling conducts downsampling to reduce di-
mensionality. In this work, we consider Mean pooling, which
is implemented in CryptoNets and also commonly adopted
in state-of-art CNNs. It splits a feature map into regions and
averages the regional elements. Compared to max pooling
(another pooling function which selects the maximum value
in each region), authors in [36] have claimed that while
the max and mean pooling functions are rather similar, the
use of mean pooling encourages the network to identify
the complete extent of the object, which builds a generic
localizable deep representation that exposes the implicit
attention of CNNs on an image.
2.2 Threat Model
Similar to [21], [23], [24], [28], we adopt the semi-honest
model, in which both parties try to learn additional in-
formation from the message received (assuming they have
bounded computational capability). That is, the client C and
server S will follow the protocol, but C wants to learn the
model parameters and S attempts to learn the data. Hence,
the goal is to make the server oblivious of the private data
from the clients, and prevent the client from learning the
model parameters of the server. We would prove that the
proposed framework is secure under semi-honest corrup-
tion using ideal/real security [37]. Our framework targets
to protect clients’ sensative data, and service providers’
models which have been trained by service providers with
significant resources (e.g., private training data and comput-
ing power). Protecting models is usually sufficient through
protecting the model parameters, which are the most critical
information for a model. Moreover, many applications are
even built on well-known deep network structures such as
AlexNet [5], VGG16/19 [6] and ResNet50 [38]. Hence it is
typically not necessary to protect the structure (number of
layers, kernel size, etc). In the case that the implemented
structure is proprietary and has to be protected, service
providers can introduce redundant layers and kernels to
hide the real structure [23], [28].
There is also an array of emerging attacks to the security
and privacy of the neural networks [13], [14], [16], [39], [40],
5[41]. They can be further classified by the processes that
they are targeting at: training, inference (model) and input.
(1) Training. The attack in [16] attempts to steal the hy-
perparameters during training. The membership inference
attack [14] wants to find out whether an input belongs to
the training set based on the similarities between models
that are privately trained or duplicated by the attacker. This
paper focuses on the inference stage and does not consider
such attacks in training, since the necessary variables for
launching these attacks have been released in memory and
the training API is not provided. (2) Model. The model
extraction attack [13] exploits the linear transformation at
the inference stage to extract the model parameters and the
model inversion attack [39] attempts to deduce the training
sets by finding the input that maximizes the classification
probability. The success of these attacks requires full knowl-
edge of the softmax probability vectors. To mitigate them,
the server can return only the predicted label but not the
probability vector or limits the number of queries from
the attacker. The Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN)
based attacks [40] can recover the training data by accessing
the model. In this research, since the model parameters are
successfully protected from the clients, this attack can be
defended effectively. (3) Input. A plethora of attacks adopt
adversarial examples by adding a small perturbation to
the input in order to cause the neural network to misclas-
sify [41]. Since rational clients pay for prediction services, it
is not of their interest to obtain an erroneous output. Thus,
this attack does not apply in our framework.
2.3 Cryptographic Tools
The proposed privacy-preserved deep neural network
framework, i.e., CHEETAH, employs two fundamental
cryptographic tools as outlined below.
(1) Packed Homomorphic Encryption. Homomorphic Encryp-
tion (HE) is a cryptographic primitive that supports mean-
ingful computations on encrypted data without the de-
cryption key. It has found increasing applications in data
communication, storage and computation [42]. Traditional
HE operates on individual ciphertext [19], while the packed
homomorphic encryption (PHE) enables packing of multiple
values into a single ciphertext and performs component-
wise homomorphic computation in a Single Instruction
Multiple Data (SIMD) manner [43] to take the advantages
of parallelism. Among various PHE techniques, our work
builds on the private-key Brakerski-Fan-Vercauteren (BFV)
scheme [30], which involves four parameters1: 1) ciphertext
modulus q, 2) plaintext modulus p, 3) number of ciphertext
slots n, and 4) a Gaussian noise with a standard deviation σ.
The secure computation involves two parties, i.e., the client
C and server S.
In PHE, the encryption algorithm encrypts a plaintext
message vector x from Zn into a ciphertext [x] with n
slots. We denote [x]C and [x]S as the ciphertexts encrypted
by client C and server S, respectively. The decryption al-
gorithm returns the plaintext vector x from the cipher-
text [x]. Computation can be performed on the cipher-
text. In a general sense, an evaluation algorithm inputs
several ciphertexts [x1], [x2], · · · and outputs a ciphertext
1. The readers are referred to [28] for more detail.
[x′] = f([x1], [x2], · · · ). The function f is constructed by
homomorphic addition (Add), multiplication (Mult) and
permutation (Perm). Add([x],[y]) outputs a ciphertext [x+y]
which encrypts the elementwise sum of x and y. Mult([x],u)
outputs a ciphertext [x ◦ u] which encrypts the elementwise
multiplication of x and plaintext u. It is worth pointing
out that CHEETAH is designed to require multiplication
between a ciphertext and a plaintext only, but not the
much more expensive multiplication between two cipher-
texts. Perm([x]) permutes the n elements in [x] into another
ciphertext [xpi], where xpi = (x(pi0), x(pi1), · · · ) and pii is a
permutation of {0, 1, · · · , n− 1}.
The run-time complexities of Add and Mult are signifi-
cantly lower than Perm. From our experiments, one Perm is
56 times slower than one Add and 34 times slower than one
Mult. This observation motivates the design of CHEETAH,
which completely eliminates permutations in convolution
and dot product transformations, thus substantially reduc-
ing the overall computation time.
It is worth pointing out that neural networks always
deal with floating point numbers while the PHE is in the
integer domain. Specifically, neural networks typically use
real number arithmetic, not modular arithmetic. On the
other hand, direct increasing plaintext modulus in PHE
increases noise budget consumption, and also decreases the
initial noise budget, which causes limited Homomorphic
operations. our implementation adopts the highly efficient
encoding for BFV in Microsoft SEAL library [44] to establish
a mapping from real numbers in neural network to plaintext
elements in PHE. This makes real number arithmetic work-
able in PHE without data overflow. Thereafter, our design is
described in floating point domain with real number input.
(2) Secret Sharing. In the secret sharing protocol, a value is
shared between two parties, such that combining the two
secrets yields the true value [22]. In order to additively
share a secret m, a random number, s, is selected and two
shares are created as 〈m〉0 = s and 〈m〉1 = m − s. Here,
m can be either plaintext or ciphertext. A party that wants
to share a secret sends one of the shares to the other party.
To reconstruct the secret, one needs to only add two shares
m = 〈m〉0 + 〈m〉1.
While the overall idea of secret share (SS) is straightfor-
ward, creative designs are often required to enable its ef-
fective application in practice, because in many applications
the two parties need to perform complex nonlinear compu-
tation on their respective shares and thus it is non-trivial to
reconstruct the final result based on the computed shares.
Due to this fundamental hurdle, the existing approaches
discussed in Sec. 1.1 predominately chose to use GC, instead
of SS, to implement the nonlinear functions. However, GC is
computationally costly for large input [24], [28], [45]. Specifi-
cally, our benchmark shows that GC takes about 263 seconds
to compute a nonlinear ReLu function with 3.2M input
values, which is part of the VGG-16 framework [6]. In this
work, we propose a creative PHE-based SS for CHEETAH
to implement secret nonlinear computation, which requires
only 12 round communication for each nonlinear function,
thus achieving multiple orders of magnitude reduction of
the computation time. For example, CHEETAH achieves a
speedup of 1793 times over GAZELLE in computing the
nonlinear ReLu function.
63 DESIGN OF PRIVACY PRESERVED INFERENCE
A neural network is organized into layers. For example,
CNN consists of convolutional layers and fully-connected
dense layers. Each layer includes linear transformation (i.e.,
weighted sum for a fully-connected dense layer or con-
volution for a convolutional layer), followed by nonlinear
tranformation (such as activation and pooling). All existing
schemes intend to securely compute the results for linear
transformation first, and then perform the nonlinear com-
putation. Although it appears logical, such design leads to a
fundamental performance bottleneck as discussed in Sec. 1.
The proposed approach, CHEETAH, is based on a creative
design, named joint obscure neural computing, which only
computes a partial linear transformation output and uses
it to complete the nonlinear transformation. It achieves sev-
eral orders of magnitude speedup compared with existing
schemes.
We introduce the basic idea of CHEETAH via a simple
example based on a two-layer CNN (with a convolutional
layer and a dense layer), which can be formulated as fol-
lows:
z = w · f(k ∗ x), (3)
where f(·) is the activation function, x is the 2 × 2 input
data, k is a 3× 3 kernel for the convolutional layer, ∗ stands
for convolution and w is the weight matrix for the dense
layer:
x =
[
x(1, 1) x(1, 2)
x(2, 1) x(2, 2)
]
, k =
[
k(1, 1) k(1, 2) k(1, 3)
k(2, 1) k(2, 2) k(2, 3)
k(3, 1) k(3, 2) k(3, 3)
]
and
w =
[
w(1, 1) w(1, 2) w(1, 3) w(1, 4)
w(2, 1) w(2, 2) w(2, 3) w(2, 4)
]
.
Note that while we use the simple two-layer CNN to lucidly
describe the main idea, CHEETAH is actually applicable to
any neural networks with any layer structure and input data
size. In the rest of this section, we first present CHEETAH
for a Single Input Single Output (SISO) convolution layer
and then discuss the cases for Multiple Input Multiple Out-
put (MIMO) convolution and fully connected dense layers.
3.1 SISO Convolutional Layer
The process of convolution can be visualized as placing the
kernels at different locations of the input data. At each loca-
tion, an element-wise sum of product is computed between
the kernel and corresponding data values. If the convolution
of the above example, i.e., k ∗ x, is computed in plaintext,
the result, denoted as Con, should include four elements,
Con = [Con1, Con2, Con3, Con4]:
Con1 : k(2, 2)x(1, 1) + k(2, 3)x(1, 2) + k(3, 2)x(2, 1) + k(3, 3)x(2, 2),
Con2 : k(2, 1)x(1, 1) + k(2, 2)x(1, 2) + k(3, 1)x(2, 1) + k(3, 2)x(2, 2),
Con3 : k(1, 2)x(1, 1) + k(1, 3)x(1, 2) + k(2, 2)x(2, 1) + k(2, 3)x(2, 2),
Con4 : k(1, 1)x(1, 1) + k(1, 2)x(1, 2) + k(2, 1)x(2, 1) + k(2, 2)x(2, 2).
In the problem setting of secure MLaaS (as introduced
in Sec. 2), the client C owns the data x, while the server S
owns the CNN model (including k and w). The goal is to
ensure that the server does not have access to x and the
client cannot learn the server’s model parameters. To this
end, in GAZELLE, C encrypts x into [x]C by using HE and
sends it to S. In the following discussion, both server and
client use private-key BFV encryption [30]. The subscript
Client (C) Server (S)
[s]
C
[ID1]
S 
& [ID2]
S
Encrypted Data [x']
C
Obscure Linear Result [x'żk'żv+b]
C
Secret Share for Server [f(k  x)-s1]
S
offline
(x, s1) (k, w)
Recover S-encrypted ReLu (Eq. (6))
*
Recover C-encrypted ReLu [f(k  x)]
C*
1
Fig. 3. The overall design of CHEETAH.
[·]C denotes ciphertext encrypted by the client’s private key,
while [·]S denotes ciphertext encrypted by the private key
of server.
S performs HE computation to calculate the convolu-
tion k ∗ [x]C . To accelerate the computation, packed HE is
employed. For example, to compute the first element of
the convolution (i.e., Con1), a single cipheretxt can be cre-
ated to contain the vector [x(1, 1), x(1, 2), x(2, 1), x(2, 2)]C .
On the other hand, a packed plaintext vector is
created for [k(2, 2), k(2, 3), k(3, 2), k(3, 3)]. The packed
HE supports the computation of element-wise multi-
plication between the two vectors in a single op-
eration, yielding a single ciphertext for the vector
[k(2, 2)x(1, 1), k(2, 3)x(1, 2), · · · , k(3, 3)x(2, 2)]C . However,
we still need to add the vector’s elements together to
compute Con1. Since the vector is in a single ciphertext,
direct addition is not possible. GAZELLE uses permutation
(Perm) to compute the sum [28]. However, computing the
sum using Perm is costly, with the complexity of O(r2) for
convolution and O(log n
no
+ nino
n
) for weighted sum in the
dense layer, where no, ni and r are the output dimension,
input dimension, and kernel size, respectively). From our
experiments, one Perm is 56 times slower than one Add and
34 times slower than one Mult.
In this paper, we propose a novel idea to enable an
incomplete (or obscure) linear transformation result to prop-
agate to the next nonlinear transformation to continue the
neural computation, thus eliminating the need for cipher-
text permutations. The overall design is motivated by the
double-secret scheme for solving linear system of equations
[46]. Our scheme is illustrated in Fig. 3.
(1) Packed HE Encryption. C and S transform the data x
and kernel k into x′ and k′, respectively, as follows:
x
′ = [x(1, 1), x(1, 2), x(2, 1), x(2, 2), x(1, 1), x(1, 2), x(2, 1), x(2, 2),
x(1, 1), x(1, 2), x(2, 1), x(2, 2), x(1, 1), x(1, 2), x(2, 1), x(2, 2)],
k
′ = [k(2, 2), k(2, 3), k(3, 2), k(3, 3), k(2, 1), k(2, 2), k(3, 1), k(3, 2),
k(1, 2), k(1, 3), k(2, 2), k(2, 3), k(1, 1), k(1, 2), k(2, 1), k(2, 2)].
7As illustrated in Fig. 4, four convolutional blocks are
computed. For example, the first convolutional block com-
putes x(1, 1)×k(2, 2)+x(1, 2)×k(2, 3)+x(2, 1)×k(3, 2)+x(2, 2)×
k(3, 3). The elements in each convolutional block are sequen-
tially extracted into a packed ciphertext [x′]C . Meanwhile, S
also transforms the kernel k into k′ according to each con-
volutional block. Note that the transformation is completed
offline. C encrypts x′ and sends [x′]C to S.
(2) Perm-free Secure Linear Computation. Upon receiving
[x′]C , S performs the linear computation based on the client-
encrypted data. A distinguished feature of the proposed
design is to eliminate the costly permutations.
Let x′◦k′ denote the elementwise multiplication between
x′ and k′. As we can see, the sum of four elements for each
block in x′◦k′ corresponds to one element of the convolution
result. For example, the four elements for first block, i.e.,
[x(1, 1), x(1, 2), x(2, 1), x(2, 2)] and [k(2, 2), k(2, 3), k(3, 2), k(3, 3)],
correspond toCon1. The next block (i.e., [x(1, 1), x(1, 2),x(2, 1),
x(2, 2)] and [k(2, 1), k(2, 2), k(3, 1), k(3, 2)]) correspond to Con2,
and so on and so forth.
S performs Mult([x′]C , k
′) to obtain [x′ ◦ k′]C . The result
is the client-encrypted elementwise multiplication between
x′ and k′. But S does not intend to calculate the sum of each
block to obtain the final convolution result as GAZELLE
does, because it would need the costly permutations. In-
stead, it intends to let C decrypt [x′ ◦ k′]C to compute the
sum in the plaintext.
However, naively sending [x′ ◦ k′]C to the client would
allow the client to obtain the neural network model infor-
mation, i.e., k. To this end, S disturbs each element of the
convolution result with a randomly multiplicative blinding
factor. Specifically, S pre-generates a pair of random num-
bers that satisfy vi1vi2 = 1, for each i-th to-be-summed
block in [x′ ◦ k′]C , where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} in this example.
S constructs the following vector v by using vi1:
v = [v11, v11, v11, v11, v21, v21, v21, v21,
v31, v31, v31, v31, v41, v41, v41, v41],
which will be used to scramble [x′ ◦ k′]C by multiplying it
with v before it is sent to C. Note that, as each individual
in the i-th four-element block is multiplied with the same
factor (since v11, v21, v31, v41 are repeated four times in v),
it would leak the relative magnitude among those four
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Fig. 4. Data transformation at client and server.
elements in each block. To this end, S further constructs
a zero-sum vector as follows:
b = [b11, b12, b13, b14, b21, b22, b23, b24,
b31, b32, b33, b34, b41, b42, b43, b44],
where bij are random numbers subject to
∑4
j=1 bij = 0. The
zero-sum strategy has been adopted in the classic privacy-
preserving data aggregation [47], where a secret key is
distributed based on zero sum of random noise.
At the same time, S uses vi2 to create the following
vectors:
ID1 = [ID11, ID21, ID31, ID41],
ID2 = [ID12, ID22, ID32, ID42],
where (IDi1, IDi2) is a pair of polar indicator,
(IDi1, IDi2) =
{
(0, vi2), if vi1 > 0
(vi2,−vi2), if vi1 < 0.
(4)
S encrypts ID1 and ID2 by using packed HE. The encrypted
values, i.e., [ID1]S and [ID2]S , will be sent to C for the
nonlinear computation as to be discussed later. Note that,
[ID1]S and [ID2]S can be transmitted to C offline, as vi1 and
vi2 are pre-generated by S.
Now, let us put all pieces together for the secure com-
putation of convolution: C encrypts x′ and sends [x′]C to S.
S pre-computes v ◦ k′ in plaintext and then multiplies the
result with [x′]C to obtain [x
′ ◦ k′ ◦ v]C . As we can see, the
i-th convolution element (which corresponds to the sum of
i-th four-element block in [x′ ◦k′ ◦v]C) is actually multiplied
with a random number vi1. Finally, S adds the zero-sum
vector by Add([x′ ◦k′ ◦v]C , b) = [x
′ ◦k′ ◦v+b]C . In this way,
v disturbs each element of convolution result (the sum of
four elements in each block) while b disturbs each individual
element in the convolutional block.
Next, we will show that, although the convolution result
is not explicitly calculated, the partial (obscure) result, i.e.,
[x′ ◦ k′ ◦ v + b]C , is sufficient to compute the nonlinear
transformation (e.g., activation and pooling).
(3) PHE-based Secret Share for Non-Linear Transforma-
tion. S sends [x′ ◦ k′ ◦ v + b]C , [ID1]S and [ID2]S to C (note
that [ID1]S and [ID2]S are transmitted to C offline).
C decrypts [x′◦k′◦v+b]C and sums up each four-element
block in plaintext, yielding y = [y(1), y(2), y(3), y(4)]. It
is not difficult to show that y(i) is vi1 times of the true
convolution, i.e., y(i) = vi1 × Coni.
If C had the true convolution outcome, i.e., Coni, it
would compute the ReLu function as follows:
fR(Coni) =
{
Coni, if Coni ≥ 0
0, if Coni < 0.
(5)
However, C only has y(i) = vi1 × Coni. Since vi1 is
a random number that could be positive or negative, it
is infeasible to obtain correct activation directly. Instead, C
computes
Add(Mult([ID1]S , y),Mult([ID2]S , fR(y))). (6)
We can show that the above calculation essentially recov-
ers the server-encrypted true ReLu function outcome, i.e.,
8[f(k ∗x)]S . Since y(i) = vi1×Coni, fR(y(i))may yield four
possible outputs, depending on the signs of vi1 and Coni.
fR(y(i)) =

y(i), if vi1 > 0 & Coni ≥ 0
y(i), if vi1 < 0 & Coni < 0
0, if vi1 > 0 & Coni < 0
0, if vi1 < 0 & Coni ≥ 0.
(7)
For example, when vi1 > 0 and Coni ≥ 0, we
have ID1 = {0} according to Eq. (4) and thus
Mult([ID1]S , y) = [0]S . On the other hand, ID2 =
[v12, v22, v32, v42]. Since y(i) = vi1 × Coni, we have
Mult([ID2]S , fR(y)) = [v12v11Con1, · · · , v42v41Con4]S .
Note that we have chosen vi1vi2 = 1. Therefore, Eq. (6)
should yield [Con1, Con2, Con3, Con4]S . This is clearly the
server-encrypted ReLu output. Similarly, we can examine
other cases of vi1 and Coni in Eq. (7) and show that Eq. (6)
always produce the server-encrypted ReLu outcome.
Eqs. (6) and (7) are created for ReLu function only. Sim-
ilar design can be developed for other activation functions
as shown in the Appendix A.
Subsequently, C creates a ReLu share s1 and computes
the server’s share as Add([f(k∗x)]S ,−s1) = [f(k∗x)−s1]S .
C sends it along with [s1]C (i.e., the client-encrypted share
s1, which can be pre-generated by C) to S.
S decrypts [f(k ∗ x) − s1]S to obtain a share of the
plaintext activation result, i.e., f(k∗x)−s1. It then computes
Add([s1]C , f(k ∗ x) − s1) to obtain [a]C = [f(k ∗ x)]C , i.e.,
the client-encrypted true nonlinear transformation result.
Note that, the random share has been canceled in this HE
addition.
Till now, the computation of the current layer (including
linear convolution and nonlinear activation) is completed.
The output of this layer (i.e., [a]C ) will serve as the input for
the next layer. If the next layer is still convolution, the server
simply repeats the above process. Otherwise, if the next is a
fully-connected dense layer, a similar approach can be taken
as to be discussed in Sec. 3.3.
Note that some CNN models employ pooling after acti-
vation to reduce its dimensionality. For example, mean pool-
ing takes the activations as the input, which is divided into
a number of regions. The averaged value of each region is
used to represent that region. Both C and S can respectively
average their activation shares (i.e., s1 and f(k ∗ x) − s1)
to obtain the share of mean pooling. Meanwhile, a similar
scheme can be applied if the bias is included.
3.2 MIMO Convolutional Layer
The above SISO method can be readily extended to MIMO
convolutional layer in order to process multiple inputs
simultaneously. Assume there are ci input data (i.e., x). Let
cn be the number of input data that can be packed into one
ciphertext. Recall that each x must be transformed to x′ as
discussed in Sec. 3.1. Let co denote the number of kernels
and r the size of each kernel. After transformation, the size
of x′ is r2 times of the original x. Therefore, each ciphertext
can hold cn/r
2 such transformed input data. Accordingly,
the ci input data are transformed and encrypted into cir
2/cn
ciphertexts.
The remaining process for linear and nonlinear compu-
tation is similar to SISO, except that the computation on a
ciphertext actually calculates multiple input data simultane-
ously and that the convolution of all input ciphertexts based
on one kernel are combined into one output ciphertext,
yielding a total of co output ciphertexts. MIMO is obviously
more efficient in processing batches of input data.
3.3 Fully-connected Dense Layer
In a fully-connected dense layer, S uses the output of the
previous layer (i.e., [a]C) to compute the weighted sum. Take
the simple two-layer CNN as an example, the weighted sum
computes
c1 = w(1, 1)[a(1)]C +w(1, 2)[a(2)]C + w(1, 3)[a(3)]C +w(1, 4)[a(4)]C ,
c2 = w(2, 1)[a(1)]C +w(2, 2)[a(2)]C + w(2, 3)[a(3)]C +w(2, 4)[a(4)]C .
The computation of c1 and c2 is intrinsically the same as the
computation of each convolution element (i.e., Con1, . . . ,
Con4) as discussed above.
3.4 Complexity Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the computation and com-
munication cost of CHEETAH and compare it with other
schemes.
(1) Computation Complexity. The analysis of the computa-
tion complexity focuses on the number of ciphertext permu-
tations (Perm), multiplications (Mult), and additions (Add).
The notations to be used in the analysis are summarized as
follows:
• n is the number of slots in a ciphertext.
• q is the ciphertext space.
• n log q is the number of bits of a ciphertext.
• ni is the input dimension of a fully connected layer.
• no is the output dimension of a fully connected layer.
• r is the kernel size.
• ci is the number of input data (channels) in MIMO.
• co is the number of kernels or the number of output
feature maps in MIMO.
• cn is the number of input data that can be packed
into one ciphertext.
In SISO, recall that a ciphertext [x′]C is firstly sent to S. S
conducts one ciphertext multiplication and addition to get
[v◦k′◦x′+b]C . Then C receives [v◦k
′◦x′+b]C , performs the
decryption, and gets the summed convolution y in plaintext,
which is followed by 2 multiplications and 1 addition to get
the encrypted ReLu, according to Eq. 6. Finally, C does an-
other addition namely Add([f(k∗x)]S ,−s1) to generate S’s
ReLu share. S finaly recovers the encrypted nonlinear result
with another addition. Therefore, total 3 multiplications and
4 additions are required in SISO. The complexity is O(1).
In MIMO, C sends S cir
2/cn ciphertexts. Then S per-
forms cir
2/cn Mult and (cir
2/cn − 1) Add to get an in-
complete ciphertext for each of co kernels. After that, each
of co incomplete ciphertext is added with zero-sum vector
by one addition. Then S sends those co cipheretxts to C,
which decrypts them and obtain co output features, creating
co/cn plaintext. Based on Eq. (6), C gets the encrypted ReLu
with 2co/cn multiplications and co/cn additions, because
each of co/cn plaintext associates with 2multiplications and
1 addition. Finally, C performs another addition on each
of co/cn ReLu ciphertexts to generate the ReLu share for
9S. S then gets its ReLu share by decryption and recovers
the nonlinear result by cor
2/cn Add. Therefore, MIMO
needs ( cicor
2
cn
+ 2co
cn
) multiplications and ( (ci+1)cor
2
cn
+ 2co
cn
)
additions, both with the complexity of O( cicor
2
cn
).
In a fully-connected (FC) dense layer, S conducts nino/n
multiplications to get nino/n intermediate ciphertext, where
n is usually much larger than ni and no. After that, the
zero-sum vector is added on each of nino/n intermediate
ciphertext to form [x′ ◦ w′ ◦ v + b′]C
2 which is sent to C. C
does the decryption and gets the summed result in plaintext.
Then C calculates the encrypted ReLu with 2 multiplications
and 1 addition by Eq. (6). Finally, one addition is performed
to generate the ReLu share for S, and S needs another Add
to recover the encrypted nonlinear result. So the FC layer
needs (nino
n
+ 2) multiplications and (nino
n
+ 3) additions,
resulting in the complexity of O(nino
n
).
Table 2 compares the computation complexity between
CHEETAH and other schemes. Specifically, In the SISO case,
CHEETAH has a constant complexity without permutation
while GAZELLE has the complexity r2. In the MIMO case,
GAZELLE has two traditional options for permutation,
i.e., Input Rotation (IR) and Output Rotation (OR) [28].
CHEETAH eliminates the expensive permutation without
incurring more multiplications and additions, thus yielding
a considerable gain. In the FC layer, we compare CHEETAH
with a naive method in [28] (the baseline of GAZELLE),
Halevi-Shoup (HS) [48] and GAZELLE. Through the ob-
scure matrix calculation, obscure HE and secret share,
CHEETAH further reduces the complexity of addition by
O(log n
no
) compared to GAZELLE. In particular, n is usually
much larger than no, which makes this reduction significant.
It is worth pointing out that CHEETAH completes both the
linear and nonlinear operations with the above complexity
while the existing schemes such as GAZELLE only finish
the linear operation.
(2) Communication Complexity. In the SISO case, CHEE-
TAH has two transmissions: 1) C sends the encrypted data
[x′]C to S; 2) S sends [x
′ ◦ k′ ◦ v + b]C to C. Thus the
communication cost is 2n log q bits. Note that the third
transmission in Fig. 4 where C sends the encrypted ReLu
share to S is the beginning of the next layer.
Similarly, in MIMO, the two transmissions are 1) C
sends S cir
2/cn ciphertexts for ci input images; 2) S sends
C co cipheretexts for co kernels. Note that, in the first
transmission, cir
2/cn ciphertexts are transmitted at the first
convolutional layer while only ci/cn ciphertexts are needed
in other layers. This is because the size of S-encrypted ReLu
will not be changed. In the second transmission, since S
can simultaneously send each of co cipheretexts after each
calculation, the actual communication cost is on transmiting
the last one of co ciphertexts. Thus, the communication cost
is ( ci
cn
+ 1)n log q bits.
In the FC layer, the two transmissions are 1) C sends S an
input ciphertext; 2) S sends C nino/n cipheretexts. As each
of nino/n cipheretexts can be simultaneously transmitted
after each calculation, the actual communication cost is the
last one of nino/n ciphertexts. The total cost is thus 2n log q
bits.
2. The structure of b′ is similar with b.
Table 2 also compares the communication costs between
CHEETAH and GAZELLE. We can see that through the
obscure matrix calculation, obscure HE and secret share,
CHEETAH completes the convolution and FC layers with a
smaller communication cost while GAZELLE needs expen-
sive GC for nonlinear functions, resulting in a much higher
communication cost.
4 SECURITY ANALYSIS
We prove the security of CHEETAH using the simulation
approach [37]. As discussed in Sec. 2, the semi-honest ad-
versary A can compromise any one of the client or server,
but not both (i.e., the client and server do not collude). Here,
security means that the adversary only learns the inputs
from the party that it has compromised, but nothing else
beyond that. It is modeled by two interactions: first, an in-
teraction in the real world where parties follow the protocol
in the presence of an adversary A, and the environment
machine Z which chooses the inputs to the parties; second,
an ideal interaction that parties forward their inputs to a
trusted functionality machine f . To prove security, the goal
is to demonstrate that no environment Z can distinguish the
real and ideal interactions. In other words, we want to show
that the real-world simulator achieves the same effect in the
ideal interaction. The proofs are sketched in the following3.
(1) Security against a semi-honest client. We define a simulator
sim that simulates an admissible adversary A which has
compromised the client in the real world. sim conducts the
following: 1) receives the transformed input data x′ from the
environmentZ , transmits it to f and obtains the convolution
result y, an S-encrypted ReLu and ReLu (pooling) share
s1; 2) constructs a ciphertext [x˜′]sim and sends [x˜′]sim to
S; 3) receives the ciphertext [x˜′ ◦ k′ ◦ v + b]sim from S,
sim decrypts it, performs summation; 4) receives encrypted
polar indicator pair, [ID1]S and [ID2]S , from S and calculates
S-encrypted ReLu by Eq. (6); 5) randomly generates ReLu
(pooling) share s˜1 and sends [f(y˜T) − s˜1]S to S, where y˜T
is the true convolution of x˜ ∗ k.
Here the view of sim that simulates C in the ideal world
is the convolution result y, an S-encrypted ReLu and ReLu
(or pooling) share s1 from f , while S’s view in the real
execution is the convolution result of x˜′ ◦ k′ ◦ v + b, another
S-encrypted ReLu for x˜ and the ReLu (pooling) share s˜1.
The above is secure against the semi-honest client: 1) the
randomness of vi1 and bij in v and b makes the two convo-
lution results from ideal and real worlds indistinguishable;
2) the private-key HE is semantically secure [30] so the two
S-encrypted ReLu in ideal and real worlds are also indistin-
guishable from sim; 3) the ReLu (pooling) shares, s1 and s˜1,
are uniformly random, thus they are not distinguishable. In
summary, the output distribution of C in the ideal world is
indistinguishable from that in the real world.
(2) Security against a semi-honest server. Similarly, we con-
struct a simulator, sim, to emulate an admissible adversary
A which has compromised the server in the real world. sim
acts as follows: 1) receives the transformed kernel k′ and
3. Since SISO and MIMO only differ in the number of transmitted
ciphertext, it is sufficient to demonstrate the security of SISO. The proof
is for convolutional kernels and the same follows for dot products.
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TABLE 2
Comparison of computation and communication complexity.
Layer Type Methodology Perm Mult Add Communication (bits)
SISO
GAZELLE O(r2) O(r2) O(r2) 2n log q + (100 log q + 15 log p log q + 25)I2 log p
CHEETAH 0 O(1) O(1) 2n log q
MIMO
IR [28] O(cir
2) O(
cicor
2
cn
) O(
cicor
2
cn
) -
OR [28] O(
cicor
2
cn
) O(
cicor
2
cn
) O(
cicor
2
cn
)
ci+co
cn
n log q + (100 log q + 15 log p log q + 25)coI
2 log p
CHEETAH 0 O(
cicor
2
cn
) O(
cicor
2
cn
) (
ci
cn
+ 1)n log q
FC
Naive method [28] O(no logni) O(no) O(no logni) -
HS [48] O(ni) O(ni) O(ni) -
GAZELLE O(log n
no
+
nino
n
) O(
nino
n
) O(log n
no
+
nino
n
) 2n log q + (100 log q + 15 log p log q + 25)no log p
CHEETAH 0 O(
nino
n
) O(
nino
n
) 2n log q
zero-sum vector b from Z , sends it to f and obtains the C-
encrypted partial convolution and the ReLu (pooling) share;
2) constructs a transformed kernel, zero-sum vector and
blinding vector as k˜′, b˜ and v˜ (corresponding to v in section
3.1); 3) receives the encrypted input data [x′]C from C, calcu-
lates the C-encrypted partial convolution [x′◦ k˜′◦ v˜+ b˜]C and
sends it to C; 4) constructs the polar indicator pair [I˜D1]sim
and [I˜D2]sim, and sends them to C; 5) receives the ReLu
(pooling) share [f(k˜ ∗ x) − s1]sim and decrypts it to get
f(k˜ ∗ x)− s1.
Here the view of sim that simulates S in the ideal
world is the C-encrypted partial convolution and the ReLu
(pooling) share from f , while the S’s view in the real world
is another C-encrypted partial convolution [x′ ◦ k˜′ ◦ v˜ + b˜]C
and the ReLu (pooling) share f(k˜∗x)−s1. First, because the
private-key HE [30] is semantically secure, the C-encrypted
partial convolution from f and [x′ ◦ k˜′ ◦ v˜+ b˜]C are indistin-
guishable from sim; Second, the uniformly random s1 at C
makes the ReLu (pooling) share from f and f(k˜∗x)−s1 not
distinguishable. So the output distribution of S in the ideal
world is indistinguishable from that in the real world.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We implement CHEETAH with C++ based on Microsoft
SEAL Library [44], and compare it with the best existing
scheme, GAZELLE4. We use two workstations as the client
and server. Both machines run Ubuntu with Intel i7-8700
3.2GHz CPU with 12 cores and 16 GB RAM. The network
link between them is a Gigabit Ethernet. Recall that the four
parameters in BFV scheme are: 1) ciphertext modulus q; 2)
plaintext modulus p; 3) number of ciphertext slots n and 4)
a Gaussian noise with a standard deviation σ. A larger q/p
tolerates more noise. We set p to be a 20-bit number and q
to be a 60-bit psuedo-Mersenne prime. The number of slots
for the packed encryption is set to 10,000.
5.1 Component-wise Benchmark
We first examine the performance of each functional com-
ponent including Conv, FC and ReLu.
Convolution Benchmark. We define the time of the con-
volution operation as the duration between S receives the
encrypted data or secret share from the previous layer (e.g.,
ReLu) till S completes the convolution computation, just
4. Available at: https://github.com/chiraag/gazelle mpc
TABLE 3
Benchmark for convolution operation
Input data size
(wi × hi@ci)
Kernel size
(kp × kq@co)
Algorithm
Time
(ms)
Speedup
28×28@1 5×5@5
In rot 7.4 247×
Out rot 6.2 207×
CHEETAH 0.03
16×16@128 1×1@2
In rot 21.4 306×
Out rot 4.65 66×
CHEETAH 0.07
32×32@2 3×3@1
In rot 2.3 115×
Out rot 1.94 97×
CHEETAH 0.02
before sending the (partial) convolution results to C. It does
not contain the communication time between S and C, such
as transmitting the (partial) convolution results to C, or
secret share to S, or in the case of GAZELLE, the time
for the HE to GC transformation between S and C for fair
comparison. All such communication time is accounted in
ReLu and pooling discussed later.
Table 3 benchmarks the convolution with different in-
put and kernel sizes. The ‘In rot’ and ‘Out rot’ indicate
two GAZELLE variants with the input or output rotation,
from which, one of them has to be used for convolution
(see [28] for details). From Table 3, CHEETAH significantly
outperforms GAZELLE. E.g., with the kernel size 5 × 5@5,
both the GAZELLE In rot and Out rot variants need more
than 25 Mult, 24 Add and 24 Perm operations to yield the
result of convolution. In contrast, CHEETAH needs only 5
Mult and 5 Add operations, one for each kernel, to obtain
the (partial) convolution results. Those results are then
sent to C for computing ReLu (to be discussed). Overall,
CHEETAH accomplishes a speedup of 247 and 207 times
compared with the GAZELLE In rot and Out rot variants,
respectively, for the case with the kernel size 5 × 5@5 and
input data size 28× 28@1.
Fig. 5 illustrates the speedup and communication cost
vs. the kernel size r. Large kernel sizes have large receptive
fields, thus capable of learning more information.5 CHEE-
TAH offers more boost for large kernels, and achieves an
average of 60 (see Fig. 5(c)) to 400 (as shown in Fig. 5(a))
speedup, with a slight exception when r = 1. This is because
with a larger kernel, GAZELLE conducts more expensive
Permutations for the final convolutional results. When the
5. Classic structures such as VGG-16 cascade multiple small kernels
to realize the same functionality of a large one.
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kernel is sufficiently large, this speedup is offset by other
computations hence the curve turns flat. This is reasonable
since large kernels (e.g. r > 9) are not desired in practice
due to their heavy computations even in plaintext. Fig. 5(d)
compares the communication cost (the size of the data sent
to C). For clarity, we sequentially denote the three rows of
system configurations in Table 3 as R1, R2 and R3. As can
be seen, CHEETAH reduces the communication cost by 33,
8 and 35 times for R1, R2 and R3, respectively.
FC Benchmark. Table 4 compares the time for the weighted
sum function in an FC layer (matrix-vector multiplication
and nonlinear ReLu) for various input and output dimen-
sions. The speedup of CHEETAH over GAZELLE is rather
impressive, from about 300 to over 400 times, thanks to the
cost savings from elimination of permutation. For example,
when no × ni is 1 × 2048, the input is a column vector
with a size of 2048 which can be packed into one ciphertext.
GAZELLE first conducts the Mult between the input and
the weight matrix. As there are 2048 chunks with no = 1, it
then performs log2(2048) = 11 Perm and log2(2048) = 11
Add to compute the weighted sum. On the other hand,
CHEETAH needs only one Mult and one Add, without
the Perm. The results are packed into one ciphertext, sent
to C and then used in the obscure HE to compute the
nonlinear activation function. This gives CHEETAH 422
times speedup compared with GAZELLE. From Table 4,
we can see that a larger ratio of ni/no leads to a higher
speedup as GAZELLE needs more Perm and Add opera-
tions. In contrast, CHEETAH needs only one Mult and one Add
operation, independent of the ni/no ratio or ni, no value. This is
more beneficial for designing privacy-preserved, large-scale
learning tasks since the objective is to map the inputs into
a high-dimensional vector in order to characterize all the
classes. The large ni/no ratio is common in networks such
as VGG16, GoogleNet and ResNet50 for the ImageNet task.
Table 5 presents the communication cost for the FC layer.
As can be seen, GAZELLE has a higher communication
cost due to GC, especially for a large output dimension no,
while the communication cost of CHEETAH is independent of
the input or output dimensions, as it needs only one ciphertext.
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Fig. 5. Speedup and communication cost with various kernel sizes: (a)
input data size 28×28@1 and kernel size r × r@5, (b) input data size
16×16@128 and kernel size r × r@2, (c) input data size 32×32@2 and
kernel size r × r@1, (d) communication cost for a convolutional layer.
TABLE 4
Benchmark for matrix-vector mult.
no × ni Method #Perm #Mult #Add
Time
(ms)
Speedup
1×2048
GAZELLE 11 1 11 3.8 422×
CHEETAH 0 1 1 0.009
2×1024
GAZELLE 10 1 10 3.63 403×
CHEETAH 0 1 1 0.009
4×512
GAZELLE 9 1 9 3.3 367×
CHEETAH 0 1 1 0.009
8×256
GAZELLE 8 1 8 3 333×
CHEETAH 0 1 1 0.009
16×128
GAZELLE 7 1 7 2.65 294×
CHEETAH 0 1 1 0.009
TABLE 5
Commun. cost for matrix-vector mult. (KB)
no × ni 1×2048 2×1024 4×512 8×256 16×128
CHEETAH 143.1 143.1 143.1 143.1 143.1
GAZELLE 147.8 152.5 161.9 180.8 218.6
Using GC, GAZELLE needs more communication overhead
between S and C. Note that this is also true for the commu-
nication time after convolution, for computing the nonlinear
ReLu activation.
ReLu Benchmark. Table 6 shows the speedup of nonlinear
operations, i.e., the ReLu function. As its obscure HE only
conducts 0-multiplicative-depth HE operation to compute
the ReLu function, followed by a one-way communication
from C to S, to send the ReLu share, CHEETAH dramatically
improves the efficiency of nonlinear operations by up to
1793 times for ReLu, compared with GAZELLE.
Fig. 7 plots the speedup and communication cost as
a function of the output dimension. Similarly, CHEETAH
achieves an outstanding speedup with much smaller com-
munication cost, independent of the output dimension,
compared with GAZELLE. The speedup quickly increases
when the output dimension increases. The communication
cost of CHEETAH only involves the number of packed
ciphertexts for nonlinear share of S. CHEETAH needs only
one round of communications. In comparison, GAZELLE
needs the GC module to obtain the nonlinear result, which
has a large communication cost proportional to the output
dimension, and needs multiple rounds of communications
between C and S. Overall, CHEETAH achieves a communi-
cation cost reduction up to two orders of magnitude compared
with GAZELLE.
5.2 Benchmark with Classic Networks
This section compares the overall performance of CHEE-
TAH and GAZELLE in complete networks from end to end,
i.e., including all the computation and communication from
the data input to the final inference result. We benchmark
TABLE 6
Benchmark for ReLu operation.
Function
Output
dimension
Method
Online
cost (ms)
Speedup
ReLu
1000
GAZELLE 115 267×
CHEETAH 0.39
10000
GAZELLE 843 1793×
CHEETAH 0.47
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on four neural network structures: (i) Network A [24]: 1
Conv and 2 FC layers with ReLu activation, (ii) Network
B [23]: 2 Conv and 2 FC layers with ReLu activation and
pooling, (iii) AlexNet [5]: 5 Conv and 3 FC layers with ReLu
activation and pooling, (iv) VGG-16 [6]: 13 Conv and 3 FC
layers with ReLu activation and pooling. Networks A and
B represent relatively shallow structures like LeNet [49] that
were used in simple tasks like recognition of handwritten
digits. AlexNet and VGG-16 achieve record-breaking per-
formance on large-scale dataset like ImageNet [5]. These
networks leverage a stack of convolutional layers to extract
complex feature relations from inputs of large dimensions
(224× 224× 3 RGB images). Thus, the capability of running
such deep networks in reasonable time is a significant
contribution to bridge the gap from research to practical
privacy-preserved computer vision applications.
Table 7 presents the speedup of CHEETAH over
GAZELLE. CHEETAH achieves 130 to 334 times speedup
across the four networks. It not only dramatically reduces
the running time compared with GAZELLE, but also brings
the running time down to the practical range. For instance,
for the VGG-16 network, GAZELLE needs about half an
hour to get an inference result (image classification), while
CHEETAH takes only 12 seconds, which is practical for
many MLaaS applications, or even potential mobile appli-
cations. This is the first time that the privacy preserved learning
can be applied to practical neural networks for real world appli-
cations. Table 7 also depicts the communication cost of both
schemes in the unit of MB. CHEETAH accomplishes from
13 to 893 times communication cost reduction, compared
with GAZELLE. This is a critical improvement that not
only relieves the requirement for high bandwidth but also
reduces the communication delay.
Meanwhile, CHEETAH eliminates the need to use ap-
proximation for nonlinear function such as Relu, thus pro-
vides prediction accuracy the same as the plaintext model.
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TABLE 7
Benchmark for classic networks.
Metrics Framework Net. A Net. B AlexNet VGG-16
Time(ms)
GAZELLE 190 1689 161,509 1,731,151
CHEETAH 0.87 5.05 1,247 12,338
Speedup 218× 334× 130× 140×
Comm.(MB)
GAZELLE 5.531 118.8 3113 64197
CHEETAH 0.429 0.643 9.15 71.9
Reduction 13× 185× 340× 893×
Accuracy
GAZELLE 98.46% 99.23% 80.18% 89.81%
CHEETAH 98.46% 99.23% 80.18% 89.81%
Plaintext 98.46% 99.23% 80.18% 89.81%
Specifically, for the MNIST dataset, the accuracy is 98.46%
and 99.23%, respectively, for Network A and Network B. For
the ImageNet dataset, the accuracy is 80.18% and 89.81%, re-
spectively, for AlexNet and VGG-16 respectively (see Table
7).
Next we examine the running time breakdown at each
layer. This would be quite helpful to locate the performance
bottleneck in the network. Fig. 6 shows the accumulated
running time and communication cost of VGG-16 network
from the first to the last layer. Each bar accumulates the
running time or communication cost breakdown from the
first layer to the current layer, e.g., the bars of “Conv.2”
denote the running time or communication cost up till
Conv.2. For better visualization of the speedup, the time-
axis is plotted in log scale.
As can be seen, the layers at the beginning of the network
give great speedup. This is due to the nature of deep
neural networks as the dimensionality of data is reduced
by convolution and pooling layers towards the end of the
network. Recall that CHEETAH enjoys a large acceleration
by avoiding the Perm operations, especially when the data
dimensions are large. Thus, it can easily handle large images
with high resolutions, and alleviates the speed bottleneck at
the beginning of those deep networks.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we have focused on ensuring privacy-
preserved inference in Machine Learning as a Service
(MLaaS). In particular, we have unveiled the fundamental
performance bottleneck in existing state-of-the-art schemes,
and proposed CHEETAH, an ultra-fast, secure MLaaS
framework, that features a carefully crafted secret sharing
scheme to enable efficient, joint linear and nonlinear compu-
tation, to make CHEETAH run significantly faster than the
state-of-the-art solutions. CHEETAH eliminates the need to
use approximation for nonlinear functions, and hence does
not have accuracy loss, unlike the existing schems. It has
been evaluated on the benchmark of well-known, practical
deep networks such as AlexNet and VGG-16 on the MNIST
and ImageNet datasets. The results have demonstrated 218
and 334 times speedup over the state-of-the-art GAZELLE
for a 3-layer and a 4-layer CNN, respectively, and 130
and 140 speedup over GAZELLE in AlexNet and VGG-
16, respectively. Compared with CryptoNets, CHEETAH
achieves a speedup of five orders of magnitudes. By our
best knowledge, this is the first time to demonstrate that
privacy-preserved deep neural networks can be applied in
real world applications.
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APPENDIX A
ACTIVATION CALCULATION
While ReLu is used as an example of the nonlinear trans-
formation in Sec. 3, CHEETAH can be generally applied to
neural networks with other nonlinear activation functions.
For example, the secure computation for Sigmoid and Soft-
max activations are outlined below.
(1) Secret Share for Sigmoid Activation. Fig. 8 shows the
design for sigmoid calculation. Specifically, C transforms
its data x into x′ and S transforms its kernel k into k′ as
described in Fig. 4. Then, C sends [x′]C to S and S calculates
[x′ ◦ k′]C . S constructs the noise vector as follows:
b = [b11, b12, b13, b14, b21, b22, b23, b24,
b31, b32, b33, b34, b41, b42, b43, b44],
where
∑4
j=1 bij = −r1i and r1i ∈ r1 is a random number
forConi, r1 = {r11, r12, r13, r14}. Then S gets obscure linear
result [x′◦k′+b]C which is sent to C. This means C can obtain
y(i) = Coni−r1i after decryption and plaintext summation.
As shown in Fig. 8, C utilizes the offline received [er1 ]S to
get the partial sigmoid for S as
Mult(Add([er1 ]S , e
−y), r2) (8)
where the i-th corresponding element in plaintext is
r2i(e
r1i + e−Coni+r1i) and r2 = {r2i} is the random set
generated by C. Then C sends the calculated sigmoid share
to S. S can get r2(e
r1 + e−Con+r1) and recover the sigmoid
by
Mult([r2]C ,
er1
r2(er1 + e−Con+r1)
) (9)
where [r2]C is sent by C offline. Here we design the multi-
plicative secret share to address the exponential property of
sigmoid. Note that tanh(x) = 2sigmoid(2x)− 1, which can
be easily extended based on the sigmoid calculation.
Client (C) Server (S)
[r]
C
[er]
S
Encrypted Data [x']
C
Obscure Linear Result [x'żk'+b]
C
Secret Share for Server [r2e
r1
+r2e
-y
]
S
offline
(x, r2) (k, w, r1)
Recover C-encrypted Sigmoid [f(k  x)]
C*
2
1
Fig. 8. Design for Sigmoid Calculation.
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(2) Secret Share for Softmax Activation. Fig. 9 shows
the design for softmax calculation. Specifically, the data
transformation of x at C and k at S is similar. Then S gets
[x′ ◦ k′]C based on received [x
′]C from C. The noise vector is
changed as follows:
b = [b11, b12, b13, b14, b21, b22, b23, b24,
b31, b32, b33, b34, b41, b42, b43, b44],
where
∑4
j=1 bij = ln vi1, vi1vi2 = 1, vi2 ∈ v (see Fig. 9
where vi = vi2) and the generation of vi1, vi2 is similar
with vi1, vi2 for ReLu. Then S calculates the obscure linear
result [x′ ◦ k′ + b]C and sends it to C. Then C gets y by
decryption and we can see that y(i) = ln vi1 + Coni and
ey(i) = vi1e
Coni . C encrypts ey ◦ r (elementwise multiplica-
tion between ey and r) into [ey ◦ r]C where r is a constant
and calculates the partial softmax by
Mult(Add(Mult([v]S , e
y), b′), r) (10)
where b′ = [b′1, b
′
2, b
′
3, b
′
2] and
∑4
i=1 b
′
i = 0. The functionality
of b′ is to remove the relative order in v ◦ ey ◦ r at S as
r is one constant. Then C sends the partial softmax along
with [ey ◦ r]C to S and S get the denominator of softmax as
d =
∑4
i=1(vie
y(i) + b′i)r = r
∑4
i=1 e
con(i) and recovers the
softmax by
Mult([ey ◦ r]C ,
1
v′ ◦ d
) (11)
where v′ = [v11, v21, v31, v41]. The functionality of v
′ is to
cancel the vi1 in e
y ◦ r as ey(i) = vi1e
Coni .
Client (C) Server (S)
[v]
S
Encrypted Data [x']
C
Obscure Linear Result [x'żk'+b]
C
Secret Share for Server [eyżr]
C
& [(vżey+b')żr]
S
offline
(x, r) (k, w)
Recover C-encrypted Softmax [f(k  x)]
C*
Fig. 9. Design for Softmax Calculation.
